INTERNET-DRAFT George Davey
draft-davey-iialp-07.txt Des Moines University
Expires: July 8, 2007 Dan Arthur
Freese Notis Global Internet
Paula Davey
KIDputer Corporation
IIALP Working Group
www.abuselog.org
Jan 8, 2007
Iowa Internet Annoyance Logging Protocol
(IIALP) pronounced E'-alp
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2007. All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This draft describes a system by which Internet Annoyances can be
logged quickly and automatically using IIALP (Iowa Internet Annoyance
Logging Protocol). The annoyance logs on a particular IIALP Server
are condensed and forwarded up the IIALP hierarchy to central Root
IIALP Servers for central annoyance queries. Serial numbers and TTL
values keep the individual reports organized and dated. One unique
complaint per IP per epoch period prevents flooding. Differences
in detail and propagation parameters exist between Root and
Subordinate IIALP Servers to allow for more detail to be kept at the
originating IIALP Server. Standard XML and TCP security techniques,
and Hierarchy Structure eliminate erroneous reporting. Routers and
software running IIALP can use IIALP to create dynamic QOS
lists for abusing Internet assets exceeding a set limits. IIALP allows
for an infinite number of different types of annoyances to exist but
has concise templates for common annoyances such as SPAM. IIALP
is a centralized logging system for Internet annoyance event
reporting.
Table of Contents
0. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Automated Nuisance Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1a. ISP Upstream Propagation to Root IIALP Servers . . . . . . . . 4
2. Serial Numbers and TTL values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Reversible Interoperability with IIALP log files . . . . . . . 4
4. IP Access List Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4a. IIALP Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Dynamic points based QOS lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Anti-Spoofing and Anti-DOS Methods for XML over TCP. . . . . . 6
6a. Zombie Proofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
7. Designed for Integration with SMTP servers . . . . . . . . . .9
7a. Links to SMTP, Null IIALP Records, Abuse Declarations . . . . .9
8. Root IIALP Servers Public vs. Private queries . . . . . . . . 10
8a. Root Server links to originating IIALP Server . . . . . . . . 11
9. Deciding What to Log in a Template. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9a. A New TLD for logging such as .log . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Upstream IIALP records are condensed Subordinate records. . . 13
11. One Unique complaint per IP per epoch period . . . . . . . . 13
12. Time synchronization and timestamp accuracy expectations . . 14
13. Security and anonymous IIALP annoyance logging . . . . . . . 14
14. Timing and Role Related Tags for XML files. . . . . . . . . . 14
15. Template Formats, Containers, and Granular settings . . . . . 14
15a. Global IIALP Server Settings vs. Granular Settings . . . . . 15
15b. Containers and Container Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15c. XML linear I/O segment and container. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
16. Statistics for IIALP Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
17. Sample Template Set 1 for SPAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
0. Introduction
Annoyance reporting was not a problem in the early years of the
Internet. You simply emailed the contact for the Autonomous
System (AS) that was annoying you and the system administrator
there would cut of the user and launch an investigation into the
annoyance and provide the abused with an answer on what happened
and what measures were taken to correct the problem.
Those were the good old days. Now Annoyance reporting contact
email addresses are overwhelmed by spam and abuse reporting is more
often missed. A centralized automated system for annoyance reporting,
including spam, is needed to help protect the Internet end user
that does not understand even what an Annoyance reporting contact
email is.
The answer is to design a protocol engineered to bring tranquility
and accuracy to the chaos of Internet annoyance logging that is
going on today. IIALP is that specific protocol. Designed to fit
the needs of the current Internet annoyance logging void and
beyond.
The following points of function describe specific aspects of IIALP
and are described as criteria for a successful Internet annoyance
logging system.
1. Automated Nuisance Reporting.
IIALP will allow end users and system administrators to enter
annoyance complaint records into a central system for the Internet.
IIALP is automated. IIALP annoyance event records are input into
the IIALP Server at the local ISP providing the IP to the abused.
IIALP annoyance event records are logged in full detail at the
ISP originating IIALP Server. As an IIALP annoyance event moves
up the IIALP hierarchy toward the Root IIALP Server it gets
condensed into a summary of the event.
All of this occurs automatically once the abuse report is logged
into an IIALP server. The IIALP system also automatically
attempts to notify downstream IIALP Servers that have new
annoyance records logged at any Root or subordinate IIALP
Server.
IIALP annoyance records contain a real-time tag, when the
real-time tag is set to 1, it means that the IIALP abuse report
was filed in real-time by a computer in real-time and not a person
such as from a port scan event caught by a firewall.
IIALP Uses another technique called null reporting. If you
send bulk email or ping a host you can create a null abuse record
preemptively so that if someone on the receiving end of the
perceived abuse logs an IIALP abuse complaint it can be matched
up with the null record. This way the abused is duly notified
that the abusive event was done on purpose and the null record
may also contain a reason for the ping or bulk email.
A TTL tag is also specified for each abuse type that allows the
complaints to expire out of the IIALP system. This allows the
system to handle more complaints and also allows the abuse
template creators to specify how long a particular complaint
should stay in the system.
1a. ISP Upstream Propagation to Root IIALP Servers.
IIALP Servers are linked together using a hierarchy. There are 3
types of IIALP Servers , Root, Subordinate, and Rogue.
Rogue IIALP Servers are IIALP Servers that are not associated with
an AS Number. These would be operated, for instance, by ISPs that
do not control the AS number assigned to their IP Space.
Subordinate IIALP Servers are IIALP Servers hosted on Internet
Networks that control an AS Number assigned to the IP address
space. Root IIALP Servers are IIALP Servers at the top of the
hierarchy and provide a place for the centralized accumulation
of upstream IIALP events and downstream IIALP notifications.
Rogue IIALP Servers can only communicate upstream to Subordinate
IIALP Servers and cannot communicate upstream to Root IIALP
Servers.
Rogue IIALP Servers communicate downstream to end users. Lower
level ISP entities lacking an AS Number must use a Rogue IIALP
Server and must connect upstream to a Subordinate IIALP Server.
This provides an automated way for an ISP holding an AS Number
to view all down level ISP entities.
Root IIALP Servers communicate to other Root IIALP Servers
and downstream only to Subordinate IIALP Servers. IIALP Root
Servers only contain compacted IIALP records. Subordinate and
Rouge IIALP Servers can contain full and compacted records.
The server where the complaint is logged keeps a full record
of the abuse and passes the compact IIALP record upstream.
2. Serial Numbers and TTL values.
IIALP event records contain a serial number, TTL, and server IP
etc. Some examples of proposed tags for this purpose are in
section 14.
The serial number for Root IIALP Servers contains enough data to
link it back to the matching full record at either the Subordinate
IIALP Server or a Rogue IIALP Server. The TTL and time stamp
info determines how long the IIALP event record will remain
active in the IIALP system.
The Root IIALP Servers have a fixed TTL value for each
complaint type based on the template for that complaint type
at the root server. Custom complaints and templates that are
not specified by the root server system can be used, but will
not propagate upstream beyond the subordinate IIALP server
where the custom complaint type is specified.
The Subordinate and Rogue IIALP Servers can have
different TTL values for different IIALP records as long as the
TTL is equal to or greater that that of the Root IIALP Server
for a particular annoyance type. Once the TTL has expired for an
IIALP annoyance record it is moved from the live system to an
archive folder for backup and eventual removal. Root IIALP
servers backup all dead records for historical retrieval.
The TTL can be adjusted from time to time to optimize the
data storage needed for a specific abuse type in the IIALP
system.
3. Reversible Interoperability with IIALP log files.
IIALP Servers may store and retrieve IIALP annoyance event records
in many different ways. Some IIALP Servers may store records in
text files and others in a database. All IIALP Servers must have
reverse compatibility with IIALP log files. IIALP log files are
XML files ending with a .iialp.xml extension. The XML file uses
tags to define data parameters being transmitted in the log file.
The minimum set of tags defines the IIALP file data with a start
tag <iialp> and an end tag </iialp> and the start tag must be
the first string in the log file.
The IIALP XML markup tags also specify such things as TTLs, IPs
and serial numbers.
These tags and templates are specified by the root servers in
HTML/XML folder paths specified by IIALP.
4. IP Access-List Compatibility and Certificates.
IIALP servers must have support for access lists both globally and
pertaining to each template as well.
IP access-list type of communication security to make sure only
authorized IIALP servers and clients are requesting and submitting
IIALP records. An IIALP server cannot accept abuse records or
transmit them until the access list is built. The access list
specifies Down-level IP addresses for IIALP clients and servers
as well as the up-level IIALP servers that IIALP server is
authorized to upload IIALP records to.
The idea is the protect the abused and expose the abuser. All
stages of IIALP implementation and design need to adhere to this
important constraint.
4a. IIALP Vocabulary
IIALP conversation uses XML tags and templates to transfer data
regarding abuse complaints to a central root system. Examples
of some tags are listed below but the dynamic list is always
supplied by the root IIALP servers.
<iialp>
<ttl>
<serial-number>
<real-time>
For any 1 abuse type there would typically be 25 to 50 template
specific tags. The tags listed above are global to IIALP and
are specified by the root server in the global template. The
global template provides the pieces for defining other templates.
5. Dynamic points based QOS lists.
One of the most important goals of IIALP is to allow ISP entities
and entities at large to query IIALP Servers to determine the top
abusers (IP addresses and AS Numbers) for a particular region or,
as in the case of the Root IIALP Servers, the entire Internet.
Specifically to allow for quick identification of Internet zombie
machines.
The top abusers are determined dynamically and in most cases
instantly. This allows for routers and computers running IIALP
to lower the priority of the abusers IP addresses or IP address
space for the TTL time period.
The concept of points based comes from the fact that IIALP is a
system for logging annoyances and allows for a query in a form
allowing for the query output to be the abusers above a certain
abuse threshold number. For instance a query could be for the
top 1000 abusers, or it could be for the abusers with over 5000
IIALP SPAM type 1 records the abuser IP Space. The idea is that
IIALP keeps track of the abusers and does not in any way block
anything by itself. IIALP is used as a tool to generate a
points based dynamic QOS list.
Rich higher level languages such as XML could interface with
IIALP and shut down the worlds banking system to an abusing IP
address all in real-time, and release them based on the IIALP TTL
specified by the IIALP abuse template for that abuse type.
There is also a manual white list that can over-ride the dynamic
QOS lists for a particular IIALP server. This way the IIALP
administrator can input a white list for known abuse record types.
You can query the IIALP server for the current white list for a
specific abuse type. An example of this would be a known email
server IP, or a known Internet search bot IP that people have been
complaining about using IIALP to input abuse complaints. If they
query the current white list first, they may not wish to continue
the complaint process. The white list is provided by the ISP and
is specific to each record. Large white lists may need to be
downloaded from an FTP site. For a given IIALP template there can
exist white listed Internet assets such as IP addresses for that
record. The white list may come back as a ASCII list or as a URL
to the ASCII list. The white list takes the form:
<wl>
asset1
asset2
asset3
</wl>
example:
<wl>
209.234.66.150
209.234.66.151
209.234.66.152
</wl>
This example is for IP address assets.
6. Anti-Spoofing and Anti-DOS Methods for XML over TCP.
Anti-Spoofing is very important to the integrity of IIALP. A bogus
report filed on behalf of an unknowing user would not be
detrimental to IIALP. Many unique complaints are by design
weighted more heavily that many abuse complaints from one host.
Also because IIALP uses HTTP and XML to communicate, the may of
thousands of previously developed TCP session security tools
can be used and designed into a specific implementation of IIALP
running on a server.
The following are guidelines for best practices that can be used to
protect the IIALP XML TCP conversation from being tampered with.
Handshakes between IIALP Server may need to be hardened
rigorous enough to ensure that the IP address cannot be masked or
manipulated. Redundant handshaking ensures the IP address sending
the annoyance event record is really using that IP and is not
using spoofing to fake it. This communication safeguard is in
addition to the certificate and access-list support in IIALP.
The handshake involves sending a session Identifier that must
be repeated for the conversation to continue.
Example 1:
cHELO
OKSTART
Example 2:
cHELO
cHELOSTR?9281370412
HELOSTR9281370412
OKSTART
Denial of Service (DOS) could also affect the accuracy and
availability of IIALP. For this reason the handshake needs to
be such that it can quickly ignore multiple attempts to send
records by IP addresses that are not permitted to send multiple
records. The access list for the IIALP server determines both
access and CB value for a given IP address.
Access lists are ASCII files on the IIALP server set up by the
administrator. IIALP servers can exchange Access lists.
Example 1, Global Access List:
<access-list><allow>
IP,CB,BE,AccessLevel 0-9
IP,CB,BE,AccessLevel 0-9
IP,CB,BE,AccessLevel 0-9
</allow><deny>
IP,Reply Type
</deny></access-list>
Global Reply Types
NAK-Negative Acknowledgement
PRIVATE-Only private IIALP access
NULL-Negative Acknowledgement 0 Bytes, sent after 3 NAKs
Granular (Template Based) Reply Types
NAK-Negative Acknowledgement
PRIVATE-Only private IIALP access
NULL-Negative Acknowledgement 0 Bytes, sent after 3 NAKs
CRYPT-Cryptography is required
CODE-Encoding is required
IP Access List Example:
<access-list><allow>
209.234.160.0
209.234.161.0
209.234.162.0
</allow><deny>
209.234.163.0
209.234.164.0
209.234.165.0
209.234.166.0
209.234.167.0
</deny></access-list>
Granular (Template Based) Reply Types can contain special reply
types.
Also duplicate annoyance records from the same IP
address will need to be ignored to prevent a person from
artificially reproducing IIALP records by mass producing them or
sending multiple duplicate records.
The Null NAK helps the IIALP server under heavy attack conditions.
Normally if a private connection only server gets a public query
it will respond PRIVATE or NAK
The IIALP server can also be set to use NULL which makes the query
appear to be unanswered.
The IIALP server can also be set to answer redundant conversation
attempts this way.
The first time or 2 the IIALP server tells queries formally,
after that is just sends a null response.
In case an email virus, for instance, causes the generation
millions of bogus complaints against an AS Number that is not
involved with writing the virus, there needs to be a way to
nullify the records using manual inspection. This is done to
avoid damage to the IIALP system not to try and figure out
which complaints are DOS and which ones are authentic.
There will need to be 2 types, blind clearing and visible clearing.
Blind clearing means the records are deleted and the Subordinate
IIALP Servers are alerted to delete as well. Replacing all the
IIALP annoyance records for that AS Number with a single blind
record that stops the accumulation for a set time interval for the
abusing asset. That asset (IP Number, etc.) is ignored for a fixed
interval determined by the TTL of the blind record at the root
IIALP server. The TTL for a blind record my be different at the
local IIALP Server than it is at the Root IIALP server.
Visible clearing means the IALP servers keep track of the bogus
records as if they were viable, but the IIALP Servers when giving
query results will identify the record with a visible clearing
tag so that it is counted for statistical reasons, but is not
used in any points calculations relating to QOS lists
derived using IIALP queries.
There is a setting in IIALP called the Circuit Breaker
setting (CB). A CB value of 1 = 1 Query/Second
The CB Value determines the maximum rate at which an IIALP
server can accept requests. The rate varies depending on
whether the request is public or private. The CB value is
determined in the access list.
Another setting called Byte Echo (BE) setting. The byte echo is
different than the hello echo string as it must be carried through
the entire conversation.
The BE String is a per conversation string can be applied in
the send, receive or both by a setting at the IIALP Server.
Only IIALP Servers can require these setting. The remote IIALP
client must accept these and other constraints in order to keep
the IIALP conversation going with that IIALP Server.
The Byte Echo has 2 parameters, enable and length.
Enable is either I for input echo, O for output echo, B for both
input and output echo, and N for no Byte Echo.
The other setting is the length of the echo string L. Here are
some examples of the format of the Byte Echo:
BE=B27 This is a Duplex Byte Echo 27 characters in length.
BE=I64 This is an Input echo 64 characters in length.
BE=N This specifies no Byte Echo.
Using the Byte echo:
A byte echo is a lower case ASCII string of characters and excludes
the lower case a-f. It is limited in length by the IIALP
server. The basic concept of the byte echo is to make the
conversation costly in terms of bandwidth to the client if needed.
The handshake can be made to be costly to the remote IIALP
client in terms of bandwidth. Servers that have DOS attacks
frequently can implement BE to cause the requests to require
lengthy and complex headers to or from the remote side.
The remote IIALP client may be required to receive these complex
headers as well. This keeps lower bandwidth DOS attacks
down. Private IIALP sessions would not have BE unless specified
by the local IIALP Server administrator.
6a. Zombie Proofing
It is recommended that implementations of IIALP servers
and applications have some sort of zombie host protection.
End user IIALP authentication needs human authentication methods
such as a distorted image interpretation.
This includes end user communication with Rogue and Subordinate
IIALP Servers at the ISP. Rogue IIALP servers may use
authentication for communication to queries.
Subordinate IIALP server to Root IIALP server communication may
also utilize authentication.
IIALP Authentication types can be set up by the particular software
implementation but should include man in the middle,
buffer overflow and packet stiffing protection.
7. Designed for Integration with SMTP servers.
IIALP needs to be made compatible with the various SMTP
implementations whenever possible. This means that some
IIALP servers may have an SMTP communications port as
well as an IIALP communications port.
Information contained in IIALP SPAM abuse records may be linked
back to a mail send event on the email server. This is the reason
IIALP needs to be built with SMTP compatibility in mind.
Like SMTP, IIALP uses TCP.
7a. Links to SMTP, Null IIALP Records, Abuse Declarations
SMTP servers can log a null IIALP annoyance record at the
IIALP Server to mark email send events. Sending email
is an event on the SMTP server that is very likely to
generate an annoyance report. It is for this reason the
IIALP allows for any server implementing IIALP to create
a null record at the local IIALP Server marking the email send
event. If a real-time IIALP annoyance record was created
for a SPAM email received somewhere else by, for example, a
Firewall device, it will be possible to match up the null send
events, with future complaint events. This is very helpful
for locating open mail Relays, etc. Or verifying an abusing IP
address.
Null records are extremely small and usually carry very long
TTL values. Other types of null events such as at the
type of null event that might occur, for instance, on a
firewall or router device may have a shorter TTL.
Many other protocols other than SMTP could also use null IIALP
event records to mark events that have potential to generate
annoyance such as search bot IP access.
Abuse declarations are really potential abuse declarations.
Abuse declaration records are matched with abuse record
templates, so for a particular template, the IIALP server
administrator can assign assets that may frequently appear in
that type of complaint.
An example is if you have an email server, the IP address for
your legitimate email server would go in the record named declared
in the container for type 1 SPAM, which is template container 1.
The public (if allowed) could query the IIALP server for a
particular AS number to see if this type1 SPAM is coming from
their main email server or a virus infected workstation.
This would allow a person to Query the IIALP server servicing an
Internet ISP for all the legitimate email servers for that ISP.
So if you were to get email from any other IP at that ISP, it has
a high probability of being SPAM or virus email traffic.
8. Root IIALP Servers Public vs. Private queries
Public and private access is determined by the IIALP server Global
setting and by the granular settings specified in the template
container for the record type based on the records template. If a
person from the public Internet makes a query for spam records for
the IP 209.234.66.150 and the query is done from 209.234.66.151.
First, the IIALP server will check the global access list for
public queries to see if the respective query is public or
private, Then IIALP will check the template container for granular
access that may be allowed based on the template type.
Root IIALP Servers can be queried by the public just like the
who-is servers are today. Public queries are a special class
that requires specific security criteria set by Root IIALP
administrator and the CB value.
Public domain and commercial software can use IIALP to
query IIALP Root servers for top threats.
Email client software plug-ins using IIALP could allow users
to very quickly send an IIALP annoyance report to their local
Rogue or Subordinate IIALP Server at their ISP.
Subordinate IIALP Servers are setup by the IIALP admin to
query Root IIALP Servers at higher rates than public queries.
Law enforcement branches such as the law enforcement could
operate a Subordinate IIALP Server and compile data from
the Root servers to help them find large abusing networks on the
Internet.
8a. Root Server links to originating IIALP Server
Root IIALP Server records are always linked to Subordinate
records which may in tern be linked to Rogue IIALP Server
records. The idea is that by querying the Root servers
you can find the problem, then by following the links and
querying the Subordinate servers you can get the detailed
record which may show more data such as optional data fields
in a particular IIALP full record.
The Root IIALP Servers always have only condensed records.
When a query is made, only the condensed record is output.
It is with the serial number that the link is established to
the Subordinate IIALP Server. The serial number points to
which Subordinate server it came from. The serial number on
the Subordinate IIALP Server record may in turn point to the
originating full record on a Rogue or Subordinate IIALP Server.
Abused persons or entities can use IIALP to help
identify networks or phone systems where abuse is more common
there by narrowing the search helping them save resources.
For historical reasons the TTL dead Root IIALP records can
be archived forever and can be made available to the public
or private by some means. Subordinate and Root IIALP Server
operators would also be encouraged to archive the records to
DVD-R or some media of choice. Investigators and historians
could use the archived data to see what the hot spots may
have been at another time.
While the live data is very useful in stopping attacks and
annoyances, the archived data could offered as historical
annoyance trends.
9. IAHT and Deciding What to Log in a Template
What to keep at the Root server condensed records? This will
need to have some flexibility as new technologies emerge.
Initially the Root servers will keep the timestamp info,
which links to the Subordinate IIALP Servers. The info
also identifies the record type, TTL, Time Stamp and many other
control bytes.
Identifying Asset Holder Type (IAHT) is the thing that identifies
the abuser or the abusing Asset. Traditionally these were IP
addresses, but at this time there are many types, IIALP allows for
an infinite number of IAHT types. Examples of 3 of them are
detailed below:
1-IP Address and assigned AS Number
2-FQDN and ICAAN registrar
3-PSTN phone number and PSTN Number operator for that number
All IIALP abuse records must have one IAHT element and likewise
each template must record at least one IAHT. Otherwise, what is
the use of reporting anything.
The IHAT attributes are defined by the root servers in the
global template set.
When a complaint finally makes it to the Root IIALP
server, the Root server will try and contact the identities
controlling the identifying assets such as IP addresses,
domain names, and PSTN phone numbers causing the abuse.
A Root server getting a SPAM abuse report originating from an
SMTP server IP will send a record of the report to the
Subordinate IIALP Server for that IP AS Number.
To find asset holders identified in IIALP records a DNS
naming convention will need to be established.
To locate IIALP servers for a particular AS Number an IIALP
service record is placed at the DNS servers serving that
AS Number.
The PSTN companies would have an IIALP Server for
taking records from digital abuse where a phone number is
associated with it. SPAM with a 1-800 number is an example.
Another example would be IP telephony abuse.
For the domain naming system IIALP Servers could be established
at a particular URL such as IIALP.domain.TLD
Whatever the naming convention, it will be important so that
Root servers receiving annoyance logs from somewhere on the
Internet can let the Subordinate servers know there is a new
record that has been added for their asset space or AS Number.
9a. A New TLD for IIALP logging namespace such as .log
The main reasoning for creating a new TLD for this is to
define a standard by which entities elect into the IIALP
system to ensure its security from forged listing servers.
This could also be done using sub domains.
Establish a new TDN such as .log and the naming convention
becomes very simple. For example, AS Number 2252 would have
an IIALP subordinate server listening at
IIALP://as2252.log
The PSTN number 515-221-2500 would be listening at
IIALP://5152212500.log
The FQDN company123.com would be listening at
IIALP://company123com.log
If adopted the .log root DNS server would translate IAHT
objects into IIALP:// URLs.
Keep in mind the traditional DNS records can be used without the
adoption of a new TLD .log. and the creation of a new TLD
for IIALP logging would only be needed to control the security
of the IIALP TLD's sold by ICANN Registrars.
This allows for a simplified method for identifying the asset
holders used in Internet abuse acts. Very large companies
may have a Subordinate server identified as company123com.log and
if it holds an AS Number 64200 and so could also have
64200.log point to the same Subordinate server. Although
It could have 1 Subordinate server for its AS Number and another
Subordinate server for its namespace.
In the case of PSTN primary circuit holders, an IIALP Server
for the PSTN number block might be a separate IIALP Server.
The key is to use DNS, either as service records, or
a new TLD. Whatever the naming convention, the DNS records
will be populated from existing ARIN, PSTN and Domain Registrar
Databases information.
You could just as easily put things beneath an iialp.org domain:
Object IIALP FQDN
---------------- ------------------------------
AS 2252 2252.as.iialp.org
555-221-2500 15552212500.tel.iialp.org
example.com example.com.dns.iialp.org
10. Upstream IIALP records are condensed Subordinate records.
There are 2 basic record templates for each complaint type
a full record and a condensed record.
The full records are held at the Rogue and Subordinate
IIALP Servers and contain more detail of the annoyance.
When the full record is passed up to the Root it is exported
for transport as a condensed record.
The condensed record mostly would contain only the identifying
and timing attributes of the full record.
11. One Unique complaint per IP per epoch period.
IIALP would be worthless if IIALP clients were not limited in
the number of IIALP annoyance reports made.
Multiple complaints are recorded within the original
complaint using the count tag. Complaint flooding only
affects the local subordinate IIALP server by causing it to
increment the count tag to its maximum value specified in
the complaint template for the complaint type. Periodically
the incremented values are propagated upstream. Each client
can only create 1 complaint per IAHT, per epoch period. The epoch
period is determined by the local and Root IIALP Server
administrators and or the template.
The Root IIALP Servers epoch period is set by
the Root IIALP Server administrators to keep the number of
records at a manageable level. The Subordinate and Rogue
IIALP Servers epoch period is set by the Root IIALP Server
administrators to keep the number of records at a manageable
value. In the case where the epoch period is longer at the Root
than at the Subordinate, the Subordinate will need to override
its value to that of the root it wishes to upload to.
Because each template specifies at least 1 abusing IAHT and IIALP
knows the abused IAHT, then it only allows 1 complaint from
IAHTa (the abused) for IAHTb (the abuser) per epoch period.
So if a person using IP 209.234.66.150 can only complain about IP
209.234.66.151 one time during the epoch period which usually is
4 hours. If a person gets an abusive call from an abusing PSTN
IP phone 515-221-2500, then the IAHT (Abused IP) can only complain
about 1 time about the abusing IAHT (Abuser PSTN) 1 time during the
epoch period. The idea is that no one person can make a big impact
to the Root IIALP Servers but a million people all annoyed by the
same SPAM can make a huge impact.
12. Time synchronization and timestamp accuracy expectations.
All Root, Subordinate and Rogue IIALP Servers must use
NTP. Standard BIOS clocks must be kept within a second
of GMT. The update period will then depend on whatever is
necessary to keep a specific BIOS Real-Time clock within this
tolerance level. Multiple time sources are recommended.
Accuracy for reporting is expected to be
within milliseconds of actual GMT. Timing is critical
for the proper function of IIALP. This is especially true with
IIALP records that have the real-time tag set. The hopes of
finding a matching null record if one exists become quite
a bit more difficult if the time is off for IIALP Servers.
13. Security and anonymous IIALP annoyance logging.
As stated earlier the abused are protected by their AS Number
holder or asset holding institution. The IP of the
annoyed may be unknown to all but the Subordinate IIALP Server.
It may be such that only private queries can get that IP
number back. The IP address may be in the record but may
not be offered to the public if the abused so desires.
The security around which information is public and which is
private is specified globally for the server and granularly
for each template type.
These settings are set by the IIALP server administrator and
sometimes are specified the template.
14. Timing and Role related tags for IIALP XML files
examples thus far:
AT-Abuse Time
ST-Server Time
TTL-Half Life of Record
TTL2-Metric of record
SN-Serial Number for record
SN-IP of first IIALP server
TZO-Time zone offset in minutes originating server
Role-Info (Root, Subordinate, etc.)
Real-Time
Compressed
TTLC (Custom TTL)
Active
These are to be defined in detail by the IIALP servers.
15. Template Formats, Containers, and Granular Settings
Template formats are like variable declarations for a computer
program. They are arranged lines of text that describe the data
type expected length and format. Each line of a template
corresponds to a line in the IIALP record.
All Data Fields are assumed to be 80 character strings unless
otherwise specified in the template. The data types are
summarized by the templates being compiled and will become the
Root template.
In most templates IP addresses should be represented using
the standard ::ffff:192.168.0.1 form to eliminate the need
for an IPV6 template. In some cases templates may want to
specifically use the IPV4 format for whatever reason.
15a. Global IIALP Server Settings vs. Granular Settings
There are global containers such as IAHT and ROOT. These
containers contain templates and template descriptions. To
find the Global settings start in the ROOT container.
Templates are located in the TEMPLATE container. Much more
definition in this area will come soon.
15b. Containers and Container Types
A template set is a specification set for an XML tag format for
a full and a condensed record pair.
A template is defined by what is in the template container and some
template containers may contain sub-containers
in addition to the classical full and compressed styles.
Standard types of compression and encryption can be added to the
template container in this manner using a MIME wrapper.
15c. XML linear I/O segment and container
XML linear I/O segment is a way to exchange IIALP records using XML.
It is used to import or export IIALP records between IIALP
Servers/clients. If the 1st line of the IIALP file reads IIALPXML
Instead of just IIALP this designates the following file is XML and
Should be parsed accordingly from the XML tag to the XML tag.
XML templates are contained in the text templates as a container
Which specifies the linear translation between the line item data
In the text template and the XML template. The master template
which will be published online will contain the XML designations
and pointers to the XML container within the other templates.
16. Statistics for IIALP Servers
These settings provide the baseline for Network
Administrators to set QOS levels to obtain a particular
predetermined statistical outcome. IIALP can be used to
generate a self measuring t test to see the outcome and
probable accuracy of certain blocking levels by guessing the
entire population from hit statistics. Basic operational stats
will be described in this section tat all IIALP servers must be
able to provide the pre-canned data sets for and these statistics
sets are also maintained in the template container for each abuse
type.
17. Sample Template Set 1 for SPAM
A type 1 abuse complaint is bulk unsolicited email or SPAM.
*Start Full Log*
SMTP (All Hops):
SMTP (Last Hop) IP:
SMTP (Last Hop) IP Registry/AS Number:
SMTP (Last Hop) IP Country/State:
SMTP (Last Hop) IP Abuse Email Addresses:
SMTP (Last Hop) TLD:
SMTP (Last Hop) TLD Registrar:
SMTP (Last Hop) TLD Registered Owner Country/State:
SMTP (Last Hop) TLD DNS TLD:
SMTP (Last Hop) TLD DNS IP:
Content IP1:
Content IP1 Registry/AS Number:
Content IP1 Country/State:
Content IP1 Abuse Email Addresses:
Content IP2:
Content IP2 Registry/AS Number:
Content IP2 Country/State:
Content IP2 Abuse Email Addresses:
Content TLD1:
Content TLD1 ICANN Registrar:
Content TLD1 ICANN Registrar Abuse Email Address or URL:
Content TLD1 Account Contact Country/State:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP DNSMx for TLD1:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP DNSMx for TLD1 Registry/AS Number:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP Registry/AS Number:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP Country/State:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP Abuse Email Addresses:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD ICANN registrar:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD IP:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP DNSMx for TLD1:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP TLD:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP TLD ICANN Registrar:
Content TLD2:
Content TLD2 ICANN Registrar:
Content TLD2 Account Contact Country/State:
Content TLD2 ICANN Registrar Abuse Email Address or URL:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP DNSMx for TLD2:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP Registry/AS Number:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP Country/State:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP Abuse Email Addresses:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD ICANN registrar:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD IP:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP DNSMx for TLD2:
Content TLD1 DNS1 IP DNSMx for TLD2 Registry/AS Number:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP TLD:
Content TLD2 DNS1 IP TLD DNS TLD DNS IP TLD ICANN Registrar:
Content PSTN Number for product:
Content PSTN Number for product Parent Phone Company:
Content PSTN Number for product Parent Phone Company Country/State:
Content PSTN Number for product Abuse Email Address:
Content PSTN Number for product Abuse Address:
Content PSTN Number for product Country/State:
Removal URL existence:
Removal URL IP:
Removal URL TLD:
Removal URL IP AS Number:
*End Full Log*
*Start Condensed Log*
SMTP (Last Hop) IP:
SMTP (Last Hop) IP Abuse Email Addresses:
Content IP:
Content Registry/AS Number
Content IP Country/State:
Content IP Abuse Email Addresses:
Content TLD:
Content TLD ICANN Registrar:
Content TLD1 ICANN Registrar Abuse Email Address or URL:
DNS IP:
DNS TLD:
DNS TLD ICANN Registrar:
DNS TLD ICANN Registrar Abuse Email Address or URL:
DNS TLD MxDNS IP for TLD:
DNS TLD DNS IP:
DNS TLD DNS IP Registry/AS Number:
DNS TLD DNS TLD:
DNS TLD DNS TLD ICANN Registrar:
DNS TLD DNS TLD ICANN Registrar Abuse Email Address or URL:
Content PSTN Number for product:
Content PSTN Number for product Parent Telecom:
Content PSTN Number for product Parent Telecom Abuse Email or URL:
*End Condensed Log*
Iowa Internet Annoyance Logging Protocol
Comments are desired for contact info see http://www.abuselog.org
for details. All suggestions sent by email must contain IIALP
in the subject line to avoid being treated as spam.
draft-davey-iialp-07.txt
Expires: July 8, 2007
end
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
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